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OPG Appellate Developments

OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC GUARDIAN FILES AMICUS BRIEF WITH
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT IN CAMRETA v. GREENE

The Office of the Public Guardian has filed an amicus brief with the United States Supreme Court in Camreta v. Greene, a case in which the Court will decide whether an interview of a possible child abuse victim by a child protection investigator or police officer at a public school implicates the Fourth Amendment, and therefore requires a warrant, parental consent or exigent circumstances.  The case arose in Oregon.  Child protection officials received a report raising suspicion that S.G., a nine-year-old girl, was being sexually abused by her father.  A child protection case worker and a sheriff interviewed S.G. at her school.  Based on the interview and other evidence, a child protection case was filed in court.  The case was ultimately dismissed, although the father later pled guilty in criminal court to fondling the son of a friend.  The mother sued the child protection case worker and the sheriff in federal court, alleging that the school interview violated her rights and S.G.'s rights under the Fourth Amendment. 

The U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon dismissed the lawsuit, finding no constitutional violation.  On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that an interview with a possible child abuse victim at a public school was a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. 

The parties' briefs focus on the interests of the parents, public school officials, child protection agencies and law enforcement.  None of the parties' briefs is written strictly from the point of view of children who are the subjects of child protection investigations.  Therefore, the Public Guardian filed his brief as amicus curiae in support of neither party and suggesting reversal.  Importantly, the Public Guardian's brief is written from the unique perspective of the children involved in child protection investigations.  The Public Guardian argues that contrary to the Ninth Circuit's ruling, an interview of a possible child abuse victim without parental consent does not automatically violate the Fourth Amendment.  Instead, the correct approach is the reasonableness test set forth in New Jersey v. TLO, 469 U.S. 325 (1985), and Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419 (2004).  This reasonableness standard should apply to child protection investigations because requiring a warrant, exigent circumstances, or parental consent for state authorities to interview a suspected child abuse victim infringes on the child's right to initiate disclosure of abuse, the child's right to safety, and on the government's compelling interest in protecting children.  Moreover, social science research provides best practice guidelines as to whether an interview of a suspected child abuse victim is reasonable.  These best practices not only increase the accuracy of child abuse investigations and decrease the trauma suffered by the possible victim, but serve the compelling state interest in reducing the long-term negative impact of child abuse on society.

The brief discusses actual child abuse investigations to illustrate the very real risk that would result for vulnerable children should the Supreme Court uphold the Ninth's Circuit's ruling.  The Public Guardian believes that his brief provides the Court with a discussion of the importance of a child's individual right to safety, as well as the critically important role that a child's opportunity to speak candidly about her safety concerns with child protection investigators and law enforcement plays in the practical protection of that right.

For full text of brief, click here.

Illinois Appellate and Supreme Court Decisions

The following are summaries of recent child welfare and disabled adult case law from the Illinois Supreme Court and the First District Appellate Court in cases where the Public Guardian represented the child(ren) or ward in the trial court and on appeal, or where the Public Guardian filed a friend of the court brief. At any given time, the Public Guardian has multiple appeals pending from all three divisions.

In re I. H., 2010 Ill. LEXIS 1541 (Oct. 21, 2010): The Public Guardian wrote a friend of the court brief In re I.H., an Illinois Supreme Court case addressing whether Section 2-18(4)(c) of the Juvenile Court Act (JCA) applies to temporary custody hearings. Under Section 2-18(4)(c), “[p]revious statements made by the minor relating to any allegations of abuse or neglect shall be admissible in evidence. However, no such statement, if uncorroborated and not subject to cross-examination, shall be sufficient in itself to support a finding of abuse or neglect.” (emphasis added). 705 ILCS 405/2-18(4)(c)(LEXIS 2010). This case involved four year-old Marifer a/k/a Maria H. and her brother Ivan H. In September 2006, Maria’s grandmother took her to the police station where she alleged that the mother’s live-in boyfriend sexually abused her. The DCFS hotline was called and DCFS investigated the allegation. The DCFS worker told the mother to not allow her boyfriend to have contact with the children. However, the mother then took the children to her paramour’s apartment and told the investigator to call her attorney. Previously, in January 2006, Maria alleged that the paramour had sexually abused her, but those allegations were unfounded. Based on the testimony of the DCP worker, the trial court found probable cause and urgent and immediate necessity at the temporary custody hearing. The petitions alleged sex abuse, and neglect due to the mother’s refusal to follow the safety plan. At trial, Maria did not testify, and the trial court did not find that she was sexually abused. However, the trial court did find that the children were neglected due to the fact that the mother did not follow the safety plan. After disposition, the mother appealed. On appeal, the Second District found that Maria’s statements at the temporary custody hearing were uncorroborated under Section 2-18(4)(c) of the JCA and reversed the temporary custody order. The trial court also reversed the finding of neglect at adjudication. The State filed a petition for leave to appeal which was allowed, and our office and the Cook County State’s Attorney each filed a separate friend of the court brief. The Supreme Court found that Section 2-18(4)(c) did not apply to temporary custody hearings under Section 2-10 of the JCA, and that hearsay statements of children did not need to be corroborated at temporary custody.  This case is important because it confirms that a lower burden of proof may to be used at the very beginning of a case.

In re Estate of Wilson, 2010 Ill. LEXIS 1542 (Oct. 21, 2010):The Public Guardian filed a friend of the court brief in In re Estate of Wilson, an Illinois Supreme Court case addressing whether a petition for substitution of judge (SOJ) for cause must be heard by a different judge if the petition is insufficient on its face. The facts in this case are unfortunately common in financial exploitation cases. Here, 86- year-old Mary Ann Wilson was being financially exploited by Karen Bailey, the daughter-in- law of Ms. Wilson’s elderly companion. Ms. Wilson and her companion were also being medically neglected. Ms. Wilson’s cousin, Arnetta Williams, asked to be appointed her guardian. At the hearing to reinstate Karen Bailey’s power of attorney (POA), the trial court asked her pointed questions about the many thousands of dollars that were missing from Ms. Wilson’s accounts. The trial court expressed incredulity at some of Karen Bailey’s answers as to where Ms. Wilson’s money was. At her subsequent deposition, Bailey admitted that Ms. Wilson’s money was used to pay Bailey’s cell phone bill, auto insurance, attorneys fees for her divorce, an addition to Bailey’s home, funeral expenses, furniture, clothing, and a truck for Bailey’s husband.¹ Four months after the hearing on the POA, Bailey brought a petition for SOJ for cause, alleging that the trial judge was predisposed not to believe her. The petition was not verified by an affidavit. The original trial judge held a hearing on the petition and denied it. The First District reversed the case, holding that a different judge should have heard the SOJ petition. The majority criticized the trial court for its vigorous questioning of Bailey. Ms. Wilson’s guardian, Arnetta Williams, filed a petition for leave to appeal that was granted. Our office filed a friend of the court brief, focusing on the unique duties of a trial judge in a guardianship proceeding. The Supreme Court found that the SOJ petition did not contain an affidavit and it failed to allege a legally sufficient basis for a finding of cause. The Court found that a trial judge can deny an SOJ for cause if the petition fails to meet threshold requirements. The threshold requirements include: 1) when the petition was filed; 2) whether the petition was verified; and 3) whether the cause alleged came from an extrajudicial source. The Court reversed the First District and affirmed the trial court’s denial of the SOJ. The Court also agreed with the argument in our friend of the courtbrief that the role of a judge in a guardianship proceeding differs from the traditional role of a judge in a civil or criminal proceeding. In a guardianship proceeding, the trial court should seek out information to protect the vulnerable ward.

In re Anaya J.G., 932 N.E.2d 1192 (1st Dist. 2010):  In In re Anaya J.G., the First District affirmed the trial court’s order terminating the mother’s parental rights. The opinion is notable primarily for its holding that the Indian Child Welfare Act’s (ICWA) notice provisions weren’t violated. Four-year-old Anaya had been born substance-exposed, had special needs, and was in foster care from birth while her mother disappeared for long periods of time. The mother occasionally engaged in services but relapsed, and only sporadically visited Anaya. The trial court terminated both parents’ rights, finding Mother unfit on numerous grounds. Mother’s main issue on appeal was related to ICWA. Father testified that Mother’s mom was a full-blooded Cherokee Indian – information he claimed he got from Mother -- even though Mother testified only that there was Cherokee blood on her mom’s side of the family. More importantly, both parents testified that they themselves weren’t members of any tribe, and neither parent said under oath that Anaya was a member of a tribe. The trial court did not order that notice of the pending Juvenile Court case be sent to the Cherokee or any other tribe. On appeal, Mother claimed that the trial court violated ICWA because the court had reason to know that Anaya was “an Indian child” and should have ordered notice sent to the Cherokee nation. The appellate court disagreed, saying the “bare assertions” of Cherokee status weren’t sufficient. The appellate court also affirmed the trial court’s ruling that TPR was in Anaya’s best interest.

In re S.D., 394 Ill. App. 3d 992 (1st Dist. 2009): This is a case of first impression, addressing the independent basis provision of 705 ILCS 405/2-27(1)(d), as amended effective June 1, 2008.  Under Section 2-27(1)(d), a court may commit a child adjudicated delinquent or charged with a crime to DCFS custody if an independent basis of abuse, neglect or dependency exists.  An independent basis exists when the allegations or adjudication of abuse, neglect, or dependency do not arise from the same facts, incident, or circumstances which gave rise to a charge or adjudication of delinquency.  Here, in 1993, the trial court found two-year-old Sam abused and neglected due to the physical abuse of the mother's paramour.  In March 2000, the trial court placed Sam in subsidized guardianship with his non-relative foster mother. In 2007, Sam's mother filed a motion to vacate the private guardianship.  In January 2008, with the agreement of the State and GAL, the court returned Sam home to his mother under an order of protection. However, in May 2008, a report indicated that Sam had been charged with aggravated robbery for allegedly stealing an iPod on a bus.  The report also indicated that Sam had been previously psychiatrically hospitalized and was currently at a psychiatric hospital.  Several status hearings were held where the judge heard that Sam's mother could not meet his needs.  Sam eventually pled guilty to aggravated robbery, and was sentenced to mental health probation.  The trial court found that an independent basis of neglect existed under amended section 2-27(1)(d) of the JCA to place 17-year-old Sam in DCFS guardianship.  DCFS appealed.  The 1st District found that an independent basis of neglect existed that did not arise "from the same facts and circumstances which gave rise to the criminal charge."  Id.at *16.   The Court rejected DCFS' argument that the 2008 modified dispositional order that returned Sam to his mother rendered the 1993 adjudication moot.  The Court concluded that based on the 1993 adjudication of abuse and neglect, Sam "had an independent basis and therefore fit into the exception by which a minor charged with a crime could still be placed in DCFS' guardianship."  Id.at *18.  This case allows teens like Sam to get the help and services they need.  

For full text of opinion click here

In re B.H., 389 Ill. App. 3d 316 (1st Dist. 2009):  The mother instructed 15-year-old Brandy to clean the house.  But, she did not.  As punishment, the mother told Brandy that she could not participate in a family gathering.  The mother then told all the children to help bring in groceries from the car.  Brandy refused.  Instead, she went to her bedroom, gathered a pre-packed bag, and announced that she was leaving.  The mother followed Brandy to her bedroom where a physical fight ensued.  During the fight, the mother bit Brandy on the chest and scratched her face.  Brandy left and went to the emergency room to receive treatment for her injuries.  The mother was charged with, and pled guilty to domestic battery.  The State alleged that Brandy was neglected and abused.  At adjudication, the mother claimed that Brandy attacked her.  The juvenile court found that Brandy was abused due to excessive corporal punishment.  Following the dispositional hearing, the court made Brandy a ward of the court and ordered mediation between Brandy and her mother.  On appeal, the appellate court found that the altercation between Brandy and the mother was one continuous punishment, beginning when the mother told Brandy that she could not attend the family dinner and ending with the mother biting and scratching Brandy.  The appellate court found that the biting and scratching was disciplinary in nature.  In other words, the biting and scratching was punishment.  The appellate court next considered whether the punishment was excessive.  It noted that excessive corporal punishment is not defined in the Juvenile Court Act but found excessive corporal punishment involved disciplinary acts that left children with injuries.  Here, the appellate court held that the mother's biting and scratching exceeded the bounds of reasonableness.  The abuse finding was affirmed.

For full text of opinion click here

In re K.H., 387 Ill. App. 3d 192 (1st Dist. 2008): The trial court found the mother unfit because she failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility for the child. The mother's parental rights were terminated and she appealed.  The appellate court affirmed the trial court's finding that the mother was unfit.  The appellate court acknowledged that the caseworkers could have been more effective but ultimately, it is the parent's responsibility to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility.  In addition, the mother knew that she was required to submit random drops, attend NA/AA meetings, have a psychological evaluation, attend parenting classes and visit consistently with Konstantinos. The mother failed to successfully complete any of the requisite tasks.  In its findings, the appellate court particularly stressed the mother's failure to visit with or even contact her child even when she was not in jail. Konstantinos has been placed with his aunt for over three years, and she wishes to adopt him. 

For full text of opinion click here

In re D.W., V.R., and N.B., Jr., 386 Ill. App. 3d 124 (1st Dist. 2008):  In this child sex abuse case, 11-year-old V.R. graphically testified about the sexual abuse her stepfather repeatedly inflicted on her for three years.  V.R. testified that she twice told her mother of her abuse, but her mother did not believe her.  And, when DCFS investigators came to the home, the mother told V.R. to lie about her abuse.  The mother and stepfather testified that V.R. was able to vividly describe sexual acts because she discovered pornographic video movies in their bedroom.  They claimed that V.R. lied about the sexual abuse to avoid punishment for stolen money.  The juvenile court found that V.R. was credible.  And, it found that V.R. and her siblings were abused and neglected.  Following a dispositional hearing, the court found that the mother and the children's biological fathers were unable to care for them.  In affirming the findings of abuse and neglect, the appellate court found that V.R. was credible.  It stated that even if some of V.R.'s details varied, she consistently described sex abuse.  In rejecting the parents' claim that V.R. learned about sex acts from watching adult pornographic movies, the appellate court stated that V.R. so graphically described some sex acts that she could not know about them unless she actually experienced them.  In affirming the dispositional findings, the appellate court noted that the mother still denied that V.R. was sexually abused by the stepfather.  Regarding the stepfather, who was the biological father of one of the children, the appellate court found that he had not completed a sexual perpetrator assessment, nor had he attended individual therapy.  Finally, the Court rejected the mother's and stepfather's argument that the juvenile court displayed personal bias, by referring to V.R. as "honey" and "sweetheart" during her testimony.  The appellate court held that the judge treated an 11-year-old child as such a child should be treated by the court.

For full text of opinion click here

In re L.H., 384 Ill. App. 3d 836 (1st Dist. 2008):  LaChristal H. was adopted at age nine.  By age fifteen, she was psychiatrically hospitalized and diagnosed with bipolar disorder.  When LaChristal's adopted mother refused to pick her up from the hospital, or to cooperate with post-adoptive services, the State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship.  The State alleged that LaChristal was neglected due to lack of necessary care. At the temporary custody hearing, the juvenile court granted temporary custody of LaChristal to DCFS.  At that hearing the mother told the court that she did not wish to visit LaChristal and she submitted a consent form to surrender her parental rights.  The court, however, refused to accept the surrender, finding that it was not in LaChristal's best interests to do so.  The mother later filed a supplemental petition for adjudication of wardship, alleging that LaChristal was dependent through no fault of her parent, and that LaChristal was a child requiring authoritative intervention.  Following an adjudicatory hearing, the juvenile court found that LaChristal was neglected due to lack of care.  The court found that the evidence did not support the mother's allegation of dependency.  In affirming the juvenile court's adjudicatory order, the appellate court found that the evidence did not support the mother's assertion that LaChristal was a dependent child.  Instead, it found that the mother did not want LaChristal in her home; that the mother acted affirmatively to keep LaChristal out of her home; and that LaChristal was in the State's care because the mother found her to be an embarrassment and desired to be rid of her.

For full text of opinion click here

In re Mark W., 228 Ill. 2d 365 (2008): In this case, the mother was mentally delayed. The probate court found that the mother was a disabled person and appointed the maternal grandmother as the plenary guardian of the mother's person. The mother later gave birth to Mark. DCFS removed Mark from the mother because she shoved a toy into Mark's mouth, while also hitting him on the head with a television remote control. Mark was placed in the maternal grandmother's care, but was later removed because he had burns on his body that the grandmother could not explain. The State alleged that Mark was an abused and neglected child. The maternal grandmother, as plenary guardian for the mother, retained counsel and participated as a party in the proceedings. The court appointed separate counsel for the disabled mother. The juvenile court also appointed a guardian ad litem (GAL) for the disabled mother. The court appointed the Public Guardian as attorney/GAL for Mark. The State later filed a petition to terminate the mother's parental rights. The juvenile court found that the mother was unfit to parent Mark and that it was in Mark's best interests that the mother's parental rights be terminated because Mark had been in a foster care for many years and his foster parent wanted to adopt him. The maternal grandmother appealed the termination order. The appellate court's two principal holdings were that neither the Juvenile Court Act, nor the Probate Act, permits the juvenile court to appoint a GAL for a mentally disabled parent when the parent already has a plenary guardian of the person. Additionally, the appellate court held that the termination hearing was "fundamentally flawed" because during his initial conversation with the mother and the maternal grandmother, the GAL for the mother obtained confidential information that created a conflict for the GAL. The appellate court also found that the GAL revealed that confidential information during the termination of parental rights proceeding. The State petitioned for leave to appeal, and the Illinois Supreme Court granted the petition. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, holding that though a disabled adult may have a plenary guardian, the trial court may appoint a GAL to make a recommendation to the court as to what is in the best interests of the disabled adult. The Supreme Court also held that the trial court need not discharge a plenary guardian prior to the appointment of a GAL for a disabled person. Also, the Supreme Court declined to hold that the GAL for the disabled mother violated any attorney-client privilege or the rules of professional conduct. The Supreme Court also found that the GAL was not operating under a conflict of interest. Lastly, recognizing the time-sensitive nature of juvenile court proceedings, the Supreme Court directed the appellate court to file a new decision within 60 days. See In re Mark W., 383 Ill. App. 3d 572 (1st Dist. 2008).

For full text of opinion click here

Litigation Unit

The Litigation Unit brings damages, declaratory and injunctive actions in state and federal court on behalf of the Public Guardian's clients.  The following are summaries of some of the Litigation Unit's cases.

Sharonda B., et al. v. Herrick

A DCFS caseworker placed four children with an unlicensed, non-relative foster parent without getting the required background checks.  The foster parent and her adult sons had criminal records including convictions for weapons and drugs.  Although the caseworker was required to visit the children monthly to ensure their safety, he never visited the home while the children lived there.  One night, the foster parent came home from a drug binge and murdered the youngest child, Coreese.  The autopsy revealed that Coreese's body was covered with old and new marks, scars and bruises, including a gaping gash in the center of his forehead, burns to his ears, chipped teeth and missing fingernails and toenails.  The medical examiner counted nearly 400 injuries to Coreese.  The Public Guardian secured a seven-figure settlement on behalf of Coreese's three siblings.

Old Orchard

The Public Guardian negotiated a settlement on behalf of a group of young men who were residents of a mental health facility.  Staff members at the facility failed to supervise the boys.  As a result, several of the boys were sexually assaulted.  The Public Guardian settled the matter for $1.5 million, including funds deposited in an educational trust that several of the young men have used for college.

Mable A., et al. v. Woodard

Three young children were placed with a relative and her boyfriend, a convicted felon.  The DCFS caseworker claimed that he visited the children monthly, but the evidence showed that he visited no more than once or twice in the year that the children lived there.  The foster parents repeatedly tortured and starved the children.  Two-year-old Carolyn had deep injuries to her feet as the result of repeated beatings with a hairbrush.  She was unable to walk and required skin graft surgery to the bottoms of her feet.  After a trial in federal court, a jury awarded the children $3.3 million in damages against the DCFS caseworker.  The parties later settled the matter.

Apostol, et al. v. Aunt Martha's

The Public Guardian filed a lawsuit against a social-service agency that placed two children in the foster home of a convicted drug dealer and then failed to visit the boys on a regular basis.  One child, William, lived in the home only five weeks before he burned to death in a bathtub full of scalding water.  Develle, age one, was found to have extensive open wounds to his back, feet and chin, and bald patches on his head.  Both boys were severely malnourished.  In September 2003, the Public Guardian secured a high six-figure settlement for William's estate and Develle.

Jesus M

In March 2005, the Public Guardian settled a case against a social-service agency whose foster parents were caught on a neighbor's "nanny cam" abusing Jesus.  The tape also revealed that the agency's transportation aide was in the home during one of the beatings.  The Public Guardian secured a six-figure settlement for Jesus.

Aisha W., et al. v. Aunt Martha's, et al.

Three-year-old Aisha and her six-year-old brother Xavier were placed in a non-relative foster home.  The Public Guardian alleged that during that time, the worker failed to visit the children on a monthly basis, failed to speak to the children outside the presence of their foster parents and failed to provide the children with social services.  As a result of these failures, the agency and caseworker never discovered that Aisha and Xavier were being horribly abused, neglected, starved and, in the case of Aisha, sexually assaulted, by their foster parents.  The foster parents pled guilty to aggravated battery to a child and served time in prison.  At the civil trial, the jury returned a verdict for the defendants.  The Public Guardian won a reversal of the jury's verdict in the appellate court.  The parties later reached a six-figure settlement.

Jennifer Y. v. Velazquez, et al.

The Public Guardian sued two DCFS licensing workers, alleging that they allowed Jennifer to be placed with an abusive foster parent.  Less than six weeks after placement, Jennifer was rushed to the hospital.  She was non-responsive and actively seizing, with bruises on her face and head.  Doctors concluded that Jennifer's injuries were the result of deliberate and violent shaking.  As a result of the abuse, Jennifer now has permanent mental retardation and is partially paralyzed.  While her cognitive damage is permanent, it is as yet unclear to what extent, if any, she will regain the use of her left side.  Jennifer now suffers from a seizure disorder that is a direct consequence of the abuse.  The parties settled the case in June 2008 in the six-figure range.

Harris v. Reed, et al.

The Public Guardian filed suit in federal court against a DCFS caseworker and a private social-service agency on behalf of Charlie C., a disabled twenty-year-old young man with the cognitive abilities of a two-year-old child.  DCFS placed Charlie in a group home.   While residing at the group home, Charlie was severely burned over almost half his body after staff members left him unsupervised in a bathtub full of hot water.  The Public Guardian settled the case in the high-six figure range in 2006.

James B., et al. v. Youth Empire Service, et al.

In January 2003, officers from the Chicago Police Department's gang unit raided the foster home of James B. and Katelin D.  Not only did officers find the expected stash of guns and drugs, they found something that they did not expect: three-year-old James chained by his neck to a bed with a sheet over him.  The Public Guardian subsequently learned that the children were abused, neglected and starved in the foster home.  The foster parents' son, who was the target of the raid, had a criminal history that should have prevented foster home licensure.  The foster mother was convicted of two counts of unlawful restraint.  The Public Guardian sued the two agencies responsible for licensing and monitoring the children in the home and the foster parents.  The parties settled the case in the high six-figure range in mid-2007.

Louis B.

A private social-service agency ignored several red flags that would have prevented a foster home from being licensed.  The agency licensed the home anyway and placed Louis there.  While in the home, the foster mother held Louis' hands under scalding water because he had been "bad."  Louis suffered second- and third-degree burns to his hands.  He has lifelong scarring and discoloration on each arm between his wrist and elbow and emotional trauma due to the abuse.  The foster mother was convicted of aggravated battery and was sentenced to five years in prison.  In September 2008, the parties reached a mid six-figure settlement.

Harris v. A.

Lawrence A. brutally murdered his wife.  The Public Guardian filed a wrongful death and survival action against Mr. A. on behalf of the couple's two young daughters, now wards of the juvenile court.  In July 2009, the Public Guardian secured a $2,000,000 judgment against Mr. A.

Aristotle P., et al. v. McEwen

The Public Guardian acts as class counsel on a consent decree it reached in a federal lawsuit against DCFS on behalf of DCFS wards.  The purpose of the lawsuit was to ensure that when sibling groups enter the child-welfare system, they are placed together and, if that is not possible, that they receive at least two, two-hour sibling visits per month.  The parties developed several policies to promote joint sibling placement and sibling visitation, including:

• DCFS created a case assignment protocol that increased the placement of new sibling groups together from 25-30% to the current level of nearly 100%.
• DCFS instituted financial sanctions against private agencies that fall below a certain level of compliance with the sibling visitation.  So far, DCFS has sanctioned more than $100,000 against private agencies.  The number of children visiting their siblings regularly has doubled since the sanctions began.
• DCFS agreed to pay transportation subsidies to foster parents.  Now a foster parent can receive up to $150 per month to transport children and supervise sibling visitation and an additional $100 to host an overnight visitation.

The Honorable Charles R. Norgle, Sr. monitors the decree in federal court.